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Banking Industry health after Silicon Valley Bank collapse: Difference between revisions
Banking Industry health after Silicon Valley Bank collapse (view source)
Revision as of 19:34, 16 March 2023
, 16 March 2023→The Role of Uninsured Leverage
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On the other hand, the 95th percentile bank uses 52 percent of uninsured debt. For this bank, even if only half of uninsured depositors panic, this leads to a withdrawal of one quarter of total marked to market value of the bank. If any fire sale discounts result from these withdrawals, this can impose substantial losses on the remaining creditors, increasing their incentives to run. | On the other hand, the 95th percentile bank uses 52 percent of uninsured debt. For this bank, even if only half of uninsured depositors panic, this leads to a withdrawal of one quarter of total marked to market value of the bank. If any fire sale discounts result from these withdrawals, this can impose substantial losses on the remaining creditors, increasing their incentives to run. | ||
10 percent of banks have larger unrecognized losses than those at SVB. Nor was SVB the worst capitalized bank, with 10 percent of banks have lower capitalization than SVB. On the other hand, SVB had a disproportional share of uninsured funding: only 1 percent of banks had higher uninsured leverage. | |||
== Silicon Valley Bank == | == Silicon Valley Bank == | ||